This paper presents a model of institutional change in the mechanism used to transmit individual reputations to potential transacting partners. We posit a dynamic principal-agent economy in which matches are made each period, and a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. Agents may be assigned to one of two different tasks. Two different reputation mechanisms are considered-in one, an agent's record of cooperations or defections is maintained without reference to the kind of task, while task-specific records are maintained in the other.
Introduction
There has recently been a resurgence of interest in investigating the role that institutions play in facilitating economic activity. Institutions provide incentives, aid in enforcing contracts, and generate information in situations where traditional market forces alone would be insufficient for these purposes. New institutions arise and develop in response to market failures, and existing ones are shaped and reshaped by these needs. With the parallel development of appropriate theoretical tools for strategic and informational analysis, it is meaningful to treat institutions as endogenous-if somewhat self-willed-actors in the economic realm.
An early and perhaps somewhat naive view was that the appropriate and necessary institutions arise whenever markets alone fail to mediate potentially profitable transactions. A position close to this is one which says that institutions arise-or change in particular ways-because in so doing they facilitate transactions more profitably, and generate improvements in efficiency. 1 Later refinements to this thesis recognized that in fact the right institutions may fail to arise for a host of reasons, prominent among which are transactions costs and externalities. 2 Considerably less attention has been directed towards a third possibilitythat an institutional change may in fact occur as a result of individual responses to a change in opportunities, even though collectively the change ultimately leads to a reduction in welfare. This is somewhat surprising since the strategic analogue of this possibility is perhaps the most widely recognized phenomenon in game theory. I refer, of course, to the prisoners' dilemma, where incentive-compatible individual choices lead to a socially suboptimal outcome-the result which more than any other underpins our interest in the economics of institutions. 3
1 The two are not the same. The first statement is that institutions arise whenever they are needed for the good, the second says that when institutions arise, it is because they are needed for the good. For an interpretation of history along these lines, see North and Thomas (1973) .
2 See for example Ostrom 1990. In a recent contribution, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) have argued that pareto-improving institutional change may fail to occur because the gainers cannot credibly commit ex ante to compensate the losers after the change.
3 In part this is because attention has largely been confined to the analysis of existing institutions, and evaluations of how the institution functions. While there are excellent This paper presents a model of institutional change, the relevant institution being the form in which individual reputations are transmitted to potential transacting partners. We posit a dynamic economy in which agents are assigned randomly to principals with whom they can cooperate or cheat in a given period. Matches are remade every period, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. Agents are assigned (also randomly) to one of two different tasks, in which they may have differing aptitudes. This allows consideration of two different reputation mechanisms-one in which an agent's record of cooperations or defections is maintained without reference to the kind of task, and another in which separate records are maintained for each task. As expected, the two mechanisms give rise to different incentives in equilibrium.
The main questions we ask are: first, suppose that one mechanism was in use, and the other became available-perhaps as a result of technological innovation. Under what conditions can we expect agents in the economy to endogenously switch from using the 'old' mechanism to using the 'new' one?
Secondly, is there reason to think that these conditions are ones in which the new mechanism is in some sense more efficient than the old one? Interestingly, the answer is that individual agents may find it incentive-compatible to use the new mechanism, initiating the corresponding institutional change, even when the change ultimately turns out to be efficiency-reducing.
In societies where agents interact with different partners at different times, reputation has emerged as the primary mechanism which enforces cooperative behavior in one-off encounters. Agents cooperate because defection in one encounter will attract adverse responses from future partners.
Such a disciplining mechanism requires that a record of an agent's past behavior be available to his current collaborators, and collaborators act according to that record in a socially agreed-upon manner. Of course, this social agreement must specify behavior which is also individually rational. 4 studies of institutional change in specific contexts (see Ensminger 1992 , for example), theoretical models of institutional change are relatively sparse.
4 This is the institution which has been most exhaustively studied by game theorists, both in the guise of infinitely repeated games (see Fudenberg and Maskin 1986, Abreu With the enlargement of the sphere of anonymous transactions during the last century, sophisticated institutions have emerged which maintain records on individual agents, and make these records available to legitimate potential partners looking to transact with those individuals. Credit bureau records, academic transcripts, and employment references are prominent examples. Depending upon the type of transaction, partners may also access criminal histories and health records. However, the law typically restricts access to only that information which is relevant to the transaction at hand.
For example, a bank can legally access credit and income information for a potential borrower, but not health data or academic transcripts.
This elaborate and compartmentalized informational infrastructure is the product of an institutional evolution which has primarily happened in recent times. It is true that traders in the Maghribi guild shared businessspecific information as early as in the eleventh century (Greif 1993) and the financial magnates of fourteenth century Venice exchanged similar information on their clients. More recently multilateral enforcement based on shared business information seems to have supported extensive trade in California in the mid 1800s (Clay 1997) . However, for the most part reputation prior to the twentieth century seems to have taken the far more holistic form of "honor" or "family name", which transcended the boundaries of specific occupations and transactions. The honor of an individual or a family could be tarnished as a result of unacceptable behavior in a single direction, but the consequences presumably extended across the board.
The clearest example of across-the-board punishment is in the practice of social ostracism, which enforced conformism in caste-based Hindu society, among others. Offenders were punished by imposing on them various levels of excommunication, which consisted of a denial of complementary exchanges of goods and services with other members in the same (usually village-level) society. Since caste rules severely restricted the activities an individual could undertake-and therefore circumscribed the directions in which he or she may have even the most basic functionality-such excom-1988) and finite-repetition versions (Kreps et al 1982, Benoit and Krishna 1985) . See Dixit 2001 for a model of intermediation in enforcement, where the intermediary is partly a repository of agents' reputations. munication constituted substantial punishment (Lal, 1988) . Punishment for social deviation in caste-based Hindu society was to a great extent contextinsensitive-the same set of restrictions on social and economic intercourse being invoked as reprisal for a variety of offences. However, with increasing anonymity brought about by urbanization, and with record-keeping facilitated by technology, it is safe to say that contemporary transactors even in Hindu society rely more heavily on the task-specific reputations of their transacting partners-on credit records and employment references, and, to an alarming extent, on academic transcripts.
Indeed, if one grants that the technological capacity to store and disseminate specific information on past actions must have been significantly limited in earlier times, then it is inescapable that reputations in the past must have been of the holistic kind. Correspondingly, if there has been (as is undeniable) an immense increase in this technological capacity, so that task-specific information can now be easily stored and accessed (to such an extent that elaborate privacy laws are needed to restrict individuals from misusing such information about others), then it must be true that at some time between the past and the present there was a period when the current practice was to use comprehensive reputation, while task-specific information was available in parallel.
The natural questions to ask are, under what circumstances would the specific information structure be used, and would the result be an increase in efficiency? These are the questions the paper asks.
We use a principal-agent model with a large number of agents and two tasks. 5 Each agent is capable of performing either task, but they have varying effort costs of doing so. Half the agents have a low cost in one task, while their costs of performing the other task is higher and distributed over an interval. The other half of the agents are similarly better at the other task. If a task is performed, it generates a constant (gross) surplus which accrues to the principal. 5 The model below has significant similarities with that in Tirole (1996) . The most prominent difference is that the present model has multiple tasks, which in turn makes possible the consideration of different reputation mechanisms. There are also differences in the way reputation works, but these are of less consequence.
In each period, an agent is randomly assigned to a principal (to whom he is anonymous) and the principal randomly draws one of the two tasks.
The principal does not know the agent's type. If she hires the agent to do the task, she pays the going wage, but has no way of enforcing that the agent puts in the required effort. However, both the hiring decision and the enforcement of effort are aided by the reputation mechanism.
The reputation mechanism is a register which records principals' complaints about agents who did not put in effort. If the agent is given a job and ends up shirking, the principal reports him to the mechanism. The report is recorded as a "mark" against the agent's name, and remains there for some given number of periods, say T .
The "old" or holistic reputation structure, which I call integrated reputation, records a mark without reference to the task-so a principal only knows whether the agent has shirked in the last T periods or not, but cannot tell which task he shirked in. The "new" mechanism, called fragmented reputation, maintains separate registers for each task. The principal can look in the register corresponding to the task which has been currently drawn, and knows whether the agent has shirked in that task in the previous T periods.
The first obvious conclusion is that, if there is an equilibrium with hiring under either mechanism, then marked agents cannot be offered jobs. The only incentive for an agent to apply effort is that if he fails to do so he will become marked, which threatens his future employment prospects. Thus if principals hire marked agents, there is no incentive for agents to perform. 6
The second observation is that an agent's incentive to shirk (or "defect") increases with the amount of effort required to perform the task, and decreases with the wage-rate. The former is his cost of effort, and the latter is what he loses in future periods if he does not apply effort ("cooperate").
Thus he is less likely to defect in the task in which he has low cost, and more likely to do so in the task in which effort is costly. Even in the latter, since there is a non-degenerate distribution of effort-costs, high-cost agents will defect while low cost agents will not.
For any given wage which induces activity, this leads to an equilibrium in which marked agents are not offered employment. Of the unmarked agents, all of whom are offered employment, a certain fraction of agents defect when offered the respective high-cost tasks, but each agent complies in his respective low-cost task.
The incentive to cooperate differs between the two structures. Under integrated reputation, marking prevents the agent from obtaining any employment at all-even when his principal may have drawn the task in which he has low cost. Under fragmented reputation, on the other hand, the agent may be marked in his high-cost task and thus denied employment in that task, but this does not disadvantage him when his principal draws the lowcost task.
Thus, when faced with the high-cost task, given the same wage, the fraction of agents who defect will be higher under fragmented reputation than under integrated reputation. However, this does not make the latter more efficient than the former, since under integrated reputation the smaller number of marked agents will remain idle regardless of the tasks their principals draw, whereas under fragmented reputation the larger fraction of marked agents will still obtain employment (and cooperate) when their principals draw the respective low-cost tasks. It turns out that in terms of the net surplus generated, one structure does not uniformly dominate the other. Now suppose that the economy is in equilibrium at a particular wage under integrated reputation, and a parallel fragmented reputation structure becomes available. Also suppose that each principal is restricted to consulting one or the other mechanism in a given period. Are there circumstances under which a principal will opt to use the "new" information? The question is non-trivial because agents' incentives are determined by the old structure which is commonly being used. We find that the answer is sometimes yes and sometimes no.
To see the intuition behind the answer, we concentrate on the circumstance in which the two mechanisms will in fact give different signals. Suppose that the principal has drawn "this" task, as opposed to "the other" task. If the agent has not defected in either task in the last T periods, both registers will return an unmarked record. If the agent has recently defected in this task, both will return a marked record. It is only if the agent has defected in the other task that the old mechanism will return a mark, while the new mechanism will not. Now this is precisely the agent for whom this task is the low-cost one.
If the agent is offered employment, will he defect and thus enter a new punishment for T periods? Or will he prefer to cooperate, knowing that he then has only to serve out the remainder of his current punishment before he can re-enter the job-market? This depends, unsurprisingly, on the number of periods of punishment he has remaining.
The principal, of course, does not know how many periods this particular agent has left (indeed he doesn't even know whether he has drawn this kind of agent-if he consulted fragmented reputation he has seen no mark), but he can calculate the expected payoff conditional on drawing this type of agent.
We find that under some circumstances, this expected payoff is sufficiently high that principals will deviate from the existing equilibrium and use the fragmented reputation mechanism instead. Under these conditions, then, the old system must fall into disuse, and we have an instance of (what may grandly be called) endogenous institutional change.
It turns out, however, that the region of the parameter space that is conducive to such change has substantial overlap with the region in which the old system dominates in terms of surplus generation. In other words, endogenous institutional change may be welfare-reducing. 2 The model
Agents and transactions
The economy consists of a large number of agents and at least as many principals. Principals and agents are randomly matched in pairs in each of an infinite succession of periods. In each pair, the principal must decide whether to hire the agent. To facilitate this decision, the principal may consult a reputation mechanism (described later) to obtain information about the agent's past behavior. If she hires, then she assigns the agent to one of two tasks. We will index the tasks by h and k respectively. In each period, each principal draws her task (h or k) randomly with equal probability.
If the principal hires the agent, then she pays the agent a wage of w. The wage is exogenously given, and the model provides no mechanism for determining the wage. We investigate the consequences of having the wage fixed at different levels. The agent can put high or low (zero) effort into the assigned task. If an agent puts in high effort, we will say that he "cooperates", if he puts in low effort, we say that he "defects" or "cheats".
Effort is not contractible. Thus the principal cannot condition the agent's wage on effort. The outcome, however, can be observed by the principal.
Thus if the agent puts in low effort, the principal reports the agent to the reputation mechanism (described below), which maintains a record of the past behaviour of agents. The principal incurs no cost in reporting.
We assume that there is a large number of principals and agents, so no agent is paired with the same principal twice (or alternatively, players cannot identify each other as ones they have met in the past). Another way to interpret the model is that principals live for only one period, and are replaced by new principals in the next period. Thus a principal has no incentive to report a cooperating agent, or to not report a defector.
Agents occupy points on the unit interval, and are equally divided between two types, h and k. Each agent knows his own type, and types remain constant over time.
A type-h agent is relatively more efficient at h-transactions, with cost a 0 ≥ 0 of exerting high effort.
For type-h agents, the cost of exerting high effort (cooperating) in typek tasks-denoted α-is uniformly distributed in the interval [α 0 , α 1 ], where
We normalise the length of the interval [α 0 , α 1 ] to unity.
Similarly, for type-k agents the cost of cooperating in type-k tasks is a 0 , and the cost of high effort in type-h tasks, α, is uniformly distributed in
The cost of exerting low effort (defecting) is 0 for all agents in all transactions.
Cooperation generates gross surplus z ≥ α 1 . Defection generates zero gross surplus.
Both principals and agents are infinitely lived, discount the future by a factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and maximize presented discounted value of future income.
For an agent of type i, (i = h, k) we will refer to the type i transaction as his "preferred" transaction, and the type not-i transaction as his "dispreferred" transaction.
The only incentive to exert high effort comes from the fact that defections are reported to and recorded by the reputation mechanism. Potential future employers consult the agent's reputation, hence defection may lead to the absence of a hire in future periods. We consider two alternative reputation mechanisms, "integrated reputation" (IR) and "fragmented reputation" (FR).
Reputation mechanisms
A reputation mechanism is a mechanism which records reports made by principals against agents who defect (put in low effort) in a task. The record consists of a register in which a mark is put against the agent's name when an adverse report is received. The mark remains on the register for a specified number T of periods, and then disappears. We say that an agent is "under punishment" if a mark is currently recorded against his name. If a new adverse report is received while the agent is already under punishment, then the old mark is removed and the new one is entered, which in turn stays on record for another T periods. Thus an agent's reputation is simply an identifier which indicates that he has defected within the last T periods.
Integrated reputation (IR) refers to a mechanism in which there is a single register for the entire economy, and reports of defection are recorded without reference to the type of transaction in which the defection had occurred.
Thus when a principal looks at an agent's record, she either knows that the agent has not defected in any transaction within the previous T periods (no mark), or that he has defected in some transaction within that period (there is a mark). If there is a mark, however, she cannot tell which transactionh or k-the agent has defected in, nor the period in which the defection occurred. 7
Fragmented reputation (FR) maintains a separate register for each transaction. When a principal reports an agent for defecting in transaction i(= h, k), a mark is recorded against the agent's name in the register for transaction i. However, no mark is recorded against the agent's name in the register for transaction not-i. The principal is allowed to check the agent's record only for the task she has drawn. Thus she knows whether the agent has defected in that particular transaction within the last T periods. 8
Strategies and equilibria
For a principal, there is no cost to consulting the reputation of her assigned agent, and to reporting an agent who defects. We therefore assume that each principal does this in every period. Since she is unlikely to be assigned the same agent again, there is also no benefit to misreporting. The principal's strategy then consists of a decision to hire the agent (or not) depending the agent's reputation status. In section 6, the principal will also have to decide whether to consult the IR or FR mechanism to verify her agent's reputation.
For an agent of type i, his strategy in the stage-game in a given period is conditioned by his reputation status in that period. At the beginning of the period, he is either unmarked, or he has a mark which is T − τ periods old.
Let τ = 0, 1, ..., T represent the number of periods of punishment remaining, where τ = 0 indicates that he is unmarked.
If he is not hired, he has no choices to make. If he is hired for a task (h or k), the agent can either cooperate or defect. If he cooperates, his punishment status will be reduced to max(τ − 1, 0) . If he defects, his punishment status will be reset to τ = T in the next period.
The agent can thus adopt one of four strategies in the stage game. When hired, he can (i) cooperate regardless of the task, (ii) cooperate in task h and defect in task k, (iii) cooperate in task k and defect in task h, and (iv) defect regardless of the task. Thus a complete strategy for an agent of type
, d} × {c, d} denotes the agent's plan of action when faced with task i or j with τ periods of punishment remaining. For each agent, we will let the first element of s τ represent his strategy component in his preferred transaction.
We restrict attention to pure, stationary, subgame-perfect strategies, and look for steady-state equilibria. The degenerate outcome, in which no agent is hired, regardless of mark, and all agents defect when hired, is an equilibrium for all configurations of parameters. The next two sections derive the conditions under which a non-degenerate equilibrium exists for each reputation mechanism, and characterize the equilibria.
Integrated Reputation
This section shows that a non-degenerate equilibrium exists for the IR economy if and only if the wage is within a certain viable range, and that this equilibrium is unique. Unmarked agents are hired, marked agents are not, and each agent cooperates in at least his preferred transaction. The agents who have sufficiently low cost of cooperation in dispreferred transactions also cooperate in those transactions.
Agents' strategies
Assume that each principal hires her assigned agent if and only if that agent is unmarked. The optimality of this strategy for the principals will be established later. An agent's strategy specifies his response to a task assignment when he is marked and in the τ -th period of his punishment (τ = 1, ..., T ), as well as when he is unmarked (τ = 0). 9 An arbitrary agent of type h has four choices of strategy (s h τ , s k τ ) in the stage game, which are and (c, c) . Of these, the third-cooperating in the dispreferred task but defecting in the preferred task, can be shown to be always dominated by the second, and will henceforth be ignored.
First consider the agent's choice of actions when he is unmarked. If the agent cooperates when assigned to a task j = h, k, then he gets a payoff of w − a hj , and moves into the next period unmarked. If he decides to defect, he gets w, and becomes marked for the next T periods. He does not expect to be hired in those T periods, but will be hired again in the T + 1-th period when he becomes unmarked.
Thus the agent's gain from defecting in the current period is the cost of the effort he would otherwise expend, while his loss consists of the potential net wages he forfeits during punishment. Accordingly, the optimal action when faced with a contract depends upon a comparison involving the cost of effort and the wage. We derive the agent's optimal stage-strategy by directly comparing his corresponding expected payoffs under the different feasible strategies.
Let w represent the (exogenously determined) wage in the economy. To ease notation, we first define an often-recurring expression
and a functionâ(w) which is central to the description of cooperative behavior, in the sense that the unmarked agent will cooperate in a task if and only if his effort-cost does not exceedâ(w).
a(w) is clearly linear and increasing in w. Defineŵ(.) as the inverse ofâ(w),
i.e.ŵ(a) is the value of w such thatâ(w) = a. The wages corresponding to effort levels a 0 , α 0 and α 1 will be invoked often, so we name them as follows:
When agents are assigned to dispreferred tasks, the restriction ofâ(w)
to the interval [α 0 , α 1 ] is relevant, so define:
We can now summarize the unmarked agent's strategy as follows:
Proposition 3.1 : If principals hire exactly the unmarked agents, then an unmarked agent's optimal strategy when hired and assigned to a task is:
If the task is his preferred task, cooperate if and only if w ≥ŵ.
If it is his dispreferred task, cooperate if and only if w ≥ŵ(α) ⇔ α ≤α(w).
(All proofs are in the appendix.)
Clearly, no activity will take place in the economy if w <ŵ. To ensures that all agents cooperate when assigned to their preferred tasks, we will henceforth assume:
Assumption 1 : w ≥ŵ.
Those agents with α ≤â(w) also cooperate in their dispreferred task.
No unmarked agent will cooperate in dispreferred tasks if w <ŵ 0 , since α 0 is the lowest cost that any agent must expend in such tasks. If the wage is higher thanŵ(α 1 ), however, even the highest-cost agents will cooperate in dispreferred jobs.
Next we turn to a marked agent with τ periods remaining of his punishment. He does not expect to be hired in the next τ periods. However, suppose he is in fact hired. If he cooperates, then he has the remaining τ periods of punishment to go. If he defects, his punishment starts again, i.e. it is lengthened by T − τ periods. Thus the punishment for the current defection is effectively shorter.
If the agent has been following an optimal strategy, and is marked, then it is because he has α >â(w), and had defected in the dispreferred task when unmarked. Since defection now carries a lighter penalty, he will defect if offered a dispreferred contract; he may also defect in a preferred contract if he has too long a period of punishment remaining (i.e. if τ is large). The threshold period is defined as τ * (w) such that
τ * (w) is well-defined. When τ = T , the LHS of (5) reduces to 0, which is less than a 0 , and when τ = 0, the LHS reduces toâ(w) > a 0 . Since the LHS is continuous and decreasing in τ , there is τ * ∈ (0, T ] such that (5) holds with equality. The strict inequality holds for τ < τ * .
Proposition 3.2 Suppose exactly the unmarked agents are hired. The optimal stage-τ strategy for an agent who is marked as a result of a rational past defection is:
Defect if hired in the dispreferred task.
If hired in the preferred task, cooperate if and only if τ ≤ τ * (w).
Principals' strategies
Next consider the principal's choice of strategy. When assigned an agent, the principal observes whether the agent is marked or unmarked, and has no other information about that specific agent. However, some of the unmarked agents are potential defectors in the task the principal has drawn.
The principal's expected payoff from hiring an agent will be non-negative only if the losses from these defectors are balanced by gains made from the cooperating agents. This requires that the wage is not too high. Letθ = α 1 −α be the fraction of potential defectors, and letφ be the fraction that is marked at any given time.φ is computed as follows: of theθ −φ potential defectors who are unmarked, half are assigned to their dispreferred tasks in each period, and therefore acquire marks. At any time there are T such marked cohorts, so in a steady-state we have
Specifically, defineŵ z such that
Proposition 3.3 Suppose agents follow the strategies described in propositions 3.1 and 3.2, and the economy is in steady-state. It is optimal for an individual principal to hire an unmarked agent if and only if w ≤ŵ z .
If w is any greater, no agents will be hired, regardless of reputation status, and the only equilibrium is degenerate. Thus we assume:
Sinceθ(w) is non-increasing in w,ŵ z is increasing in z. If w ≤ŵ 0 , we haveθ(w) = 1, and the value of z necessary to make the economy viable is z ≥ 2w. At the other extreme when w ≥ŵ 1 , i.e. no one defects in any task, it is sufficient that z = w. Hence z ≥ max{2ŵ 0 ,ŵ 1 } is a sufficient bound to ensure that the economy is viable over the entire range [ŵ, z] of wages.
Finally we turn to the principal who is faced with a marked agent. We know that some of these agents would in fact cooperate if hired in the preferred task (see proposition 3.2). If w is small relative to z, then the gain on those agents who do cooperate outweighs the loss on the ones that do not, and the principal will be induced to hire marked agents. But then agents have no incentive to cooperate, and the equilibrium breaks down.
Indeed, of the T cohorts of marked agents, those with τ ≤ τ * (w) periods of punishment would cooperate in the preferred task. Since half of the agents are assigned to preferred tasks, the principal's expected gain from hiring marked agents is non-positive only if the following condition is satisfied, which we state as an assumption.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose agents follow the strategy profile described by propositions 3.1 and 3.2, and the economy is in steady-state. Then it is optimal for an individual principal to not hire a marked agent if and only if assumption 3 is satisfied.
Assumption 3 provides another lower bound on the wage, along withŵ in assumption 1. This bound is inconvenient since τ * (w) on the RHS of assumption 3 is itself a function of w, and it is not possible to make the relation explicit. However, it turns out that assumption 1 implies assumption 3 if the length of punishment is large enough.
Observation 1 : Assumption 3 holds if assumption 1 is satisfied and
This condition is not necessary for assumption 3 to be satisfied. However, it provides a more tractable bound, and will be used in section 6.
Equilibrium
Using the propositions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we can state:
Theorem 3.5 : If assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied, then there is a unique subgame-perfect, steady-state equilibrium for the IR economy.
In this equilibrium, principals only hire unmarked agents, and each such agent cooperates unless he has α >â(w) and is assigned to his dispreferred task.
Further, if any one of the three assumptions is not satisfied, then the only equilibrium is the degenerate one in which no agent is hired .
The proof follows readily from the propositions, and is omitted.
Fragmented Reputation
This section establishes the conditions that ensure the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium under FR. Individual components of the equilibrium strategy profile are stated as propositions 4.1 to 4.3. The existence result is then stated as theorem 4.4.
Again, we establish that in the only possible non-degenerate equilibria, unmarked agents are hired and marked agents are not. Further, every agent cooperates in his preferred transaction, and agents with low enough costs α ≤α also cooperate in their dispreferred transactions.
For a range of wages [w 0 ,w z ] and a value ofα to be determined below, this strategy profile constitutes the unique non-degenerate equilibrium.
Recall that under FR the principal can only consult the agent's record corresponding to the transaction which she has drawn in the current period.
Agents' strategies
The considerations for the agent's choice of strategy are simpler, since his reputation in a given transaction only affects his future employment possibilities in that transaction.
First define the function that describes the pattern of cooperation:
and its inversew
which leads to the following benchmark values:
Note thatã(w) is increasing in w, and reduces to a 0 if w =w. Let:
As in the IR economy, these define the ranges of wages and effort costs which separate cooperators from defectors.α(w) is the highest effort level which is compatible with cooperation in the dispreferred task.
Proposition 4.1 : If principals hire exactly the unmarked agents, then an unmarked agent's optimal strategy when hired and assigned to a task is as follows:
If the task is the preferred task, cooperate if and only if w ≥w.
If the task is in the dispreferred task, cooperate if and only if α ≤α(w) ⇔ w ≥w(α).
In order to ensure a non-degenerate equilibrium, we assume Assumption 4 : w ≥w.
Next consider a marked agent i in the τ -th period of his punishment in transaction j, and suppose that he is hired (this is off the equilibrium path). If he defects, his punishment is lengthened by τ periods (since it starts all over again). This punishment for a second defection is lighter than the punishment for the original defection. If he cooperates his remaining punishment is unaffected.
If the agent is under punishment because he had earlier rationally defected in this task, it follows that he will do best to defect now. Consideration of an agent who has earlier made a disequilibrium move is not important since it does not affect the principals' expectations.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose principals hire exactly the unmarked agents. An agent who is currently marked in a given task because of an earlier rational defection in that task will find it optimal to defect again if hired in that task.
Principals' strategies
Of all the agents assigned to a given task in a given period, one-half are in their preferred task-hence they are unmarked and will not defect. The other half are in their dispreferred task. Some of these have high effort cost, and are potential defectors. Some potential defectors are marked, and some are unmarked.
If a principal hires to an unmarked agent, the agent will defect with a probability equal to the fraction of unmarked agents who are potential defectors. Letθ = α 1 −α represent the fraction of agents that are potential defectors. In order to make it profitable to hire, the principal's gain on the fraction of agents who cooperate must outweigh the loss on those that defect.
This requires w ≤w z , which is defined bỹ
When a principal is faced with a marked agent, he expects the agent to defect with probability one, and will therefore not offer a contract. The principal's optimal strategy is therefore summarized as follows. Assumption 5 w ≤w z .
We can verify that, when w =w,θ(w) = 1 and the assumption is satisfied if z ≥ T + 4 T + 2 w. When w ≥w 1 ,θ(w) = 0 and z ≥ w is sufficient. Note, incidentally, that the highest wagew z which is compatible with activity in the economy under FR is larger thanŵ z , the highest viable wage under IR.
Equilibrium
Combining propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, we can state the following result. In equilibrium, principals hire only the agents who are unmarked in the assigned task, and each such agent cooperates unless he has α >ã(w) and is assigned to his dispreferred task.
Further, if either of the two assumptions is not satisfied, then the only equilibrium is the degenerate one in which no agent is hired.
Efficiency comparisons
In this section we address the question of comparative efficiency of the two reputation mechanisms, taking as yardstick the surplus net of effort-cost that is generated each period. All calculations are made using the assumption that the economy is in steady-state under the respective reputation mechanism.
The last two sections showed that the degree of cooperation under either mechanism varies with the wage. Hence the amount of surplus also varies accordingly. In comparing the two mechanisms, therefore, we hold the wage constant, and ask whether one or the other generates a greater surplus at a given wage. The answer depends on the level at which the wage is fixed.
To ensure that there is an equilibrium at each relevant wage, assume z is sufficiently large such that assumptions 2 and 5 are satisfied for w ≤w 1 .
Also let T be large enough for the condition in observation 1 be satisfied.
The maximum potential surplus S * is generated when all agents cooperate in either task. Half the agents are assigned to their preferred tasks and generate a net surplus of (z − a 0 ) each,while the other half are assigned to dispreferred tasks and generate (z − α). Noting that α is uniformly distributed on the interval [α 0 , α 1 ], the length of which has been normalised to unity, we obtain:
To facilitate comparison in the range [w,ŵ 1 ), we compute the surplus under the two mechanisms explicitly.
Integrated Reputation: Given a wage w, a fractionθ(w) = α 1 −α(w) of agents defect in dispreferred tasks. In steady-state, T T + 2 of these are marked (see equation (6)), and are therefore not hired. Of the remainder, half are assigned to preferred tasks and cooperate, generating a surplus of z − a 0 each, while the other half are assigned to dispreferred tasks and defect.
The fraction 1−θ(w) =α(w)−α 0 are unmarked and cooperate regardless of task. Half are assigned to preferred tasks and generate z − a 0 each, while the other half are assigned to dispreferred tasks and generate z − α each.
Combining we obtain the net surplus:
The net surplus is zero for wages belowŵ, where it jumps to 1 T +2 (z − a 0 ) and remains constant until the wage reachesŵ 0 . Thereafter it increases monotonically to reach S * atŵ 1 , where it becomes constant again.
Fragmented Reputation: Under FR, all agents are unmarked when assigned to their preferred tasks, and hence such agents are always hired. Of the half that are assigned to their dispreferred tasks, a fractionθ = α 1 −α(w) are potential defectors. These are either marked and not hired, or they are unmarked, hired, and defect. In either case this fraction generates zero surplus. The remainingα(w) − α 0 cooperate in their dispreferred tasks, therefore they are unmarked and are hired. The total surplus generated therefore turns out to be:
S(w) is zero for w <w, at which point it jumps up to 1 2 (z − a 0 ), where it remains constant untilw 0 . Thereafter it rises monotonically until it reaches S * atw 1 , and becomes constant.
Graphs ofS andŜ are drawn in figure 1 for two sets of parameters.
Analytically, the comparison between the two mechanisms is straightforward for w <w and w ≥ŵ 1 , and we record these first. From equations (1), (3) and (10) it can readily be ascertained thatŵ <w andŵ 1 <w 1 .
Proposition 5.1 The following efficiency comparisons holds for wages outside the interval [w,ŵ 1 ).
For w <ŵ there is no activity under either IR or FR, hence both mechanisms generate zero surplus.
For w ∈ [ŵ,w) there is some activity and cooperation under IR, but no activity under FR, hence the former generates greater surplus.
For w ∈ [ŵ 1 ,w 1 ), all agents cooperate and none are marked under the IR mechanism, hence the full surplus S * is realised. However, there is some defection under the FR mechanism, and some agents are marked. Hence IR generates greater surplus.
For w ≥w 1 both mechanisms generate full cooperation and the full surplus
Though in the intervals considered above IR dominates FR in terms of surplus generated, this may be reversed in part of the interval [w,ŵ 1 ). Note that there is a discontinuity inS atw, which is the lowest wage for which the FR economy has an active equilibrium. This equilibrium generates a surplus which is larger than that generated by IR at its lowest viable wagê w.
Thus if the degree of cooperation in the IR economy does not rise to too high a level at w =w, thenS will jump up aboveŜ at this point. In particular this will hold if α 0 is greater than the value attained byâ(w) atw.
A less restrictive sufficient condition, which subsumes the above condition, is derived below.
Proposition 5.2 The surplus generated by FR at w =w is greater than that generated by IR ifα(w) <
This is a sufficient condition, and is stronger than necessary for the antecedent to hold. The condition in the proposition essentially requires that the interval [α 0 , α 1 ] is located sufficiently high compared to a 0 , though even α 0 = a 0 may be adequate for the condition to hold.
Even ifS exceedsŜ atw, the latter must overtake the former beforê w 1 , since we know thatŜ(ŵ 1 ) is strictly greater thanS(ŵ 1 ). Both functions are continuous for w >w, and it is straightforward to show thatŜ has a steeper positive slope in the interval (w 0 ,ŵ 1 ). These observations, together with the previous propositions, lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 IR generates strictly greater surplus than FR for all wageŝ w ≤ w ≤ŵ 1 , except possibly in an intervalw ≤ w ≤ w * , where w * <ŵ 1 .
Corollary 5.4 There exists a non-empty interval which includesŵ 1 in its interior on which IR is strictly more efficient than FR.
Transition between regimes
Suppose that the economy operates under an IR mechanism, and is in a steady-state. Now imagine that, exogenously, a parallel FR mechanism becomes available. This may occur as a result of technological change, which allows more detailed information to be acquired and stored. Or it may reflect private initiative in response to a perceived profitable opportunity. Nevertheless, given the existing equilibrium, agents expect their future principals to consult the IR records and not the FR ones, and incentives are accordingly defined.
Nevertheless, individual principals may prefer to consult the FR records rather than the IR records. In this section we identify conditions under which this is true. It then follows that, under those conditions, use of the IR mechanism alone cannot continue to be part of an equilibrium. The economy must move to a new state in which the FR mechanism is used at least by some principals.
As argued in the introductory section, such a change have indeed occured in the past century. However, a switch turns out to be incentive-compatible only under specific conditions. What is more interesting, some of these conditions overlap with those under which, in the previous section, we found FR to be less efficient than IR.
Let the economy be in a steady-state where all principals consult the IR mechanism. Suppose the FR mechanism becomes available, so that an individual principal has the option of consulting the FR register instead.
We assume that a principal is only permitted to consult one mechanism in a given period. This assumption would be validated if there is some small cost of acquiring the information, or if she has to 'buy into' one or the other mechanism. It will be clear from what follows that it is never useful for a principal to use more than one reputation mechanism. To avoid clutter, I
have assumed this to be a rule rather than prove it as a proposition.
Let w <ŵ 1 , so that some agents cheat in their dispreferred tasks, and consequently some agents are marked. Consider a principal who has drawn an h-task, and has been assigned an agent. This principal has the option of consulting the IR mechanism, or the h-register under the FR mechanism.
Note that her information structure under the second option is not a refinement of the first. The two options will yield different signals under some circumstances. Under other circumstances the signals will be indistinguishable.
The agent may be in one of the following three states. He may be currently unmarked-i.e., he has not cheated in either task in the previous T periods. Both the IR register and the FR register will then show him as unmarked. Alternatively, he may have a mark because he cheated in an h-task within the previous T periods. In this case, both the IR register as well as the FR register for h-tasks will show him as marked. In either of these cases, both registers yield the same signal to the principal.
The third possibility is that the agent may be currently marked because he cheated in a not-h task within the past T periods. The IR register will then show him as marked, whereas the FR register for h-tasks will show him as unmarked. Thus the principal would hire this agent if she consulted the FR mechanism, but not the IR mechanism.
This is the only event in which the principal receives different signals from the two mechanisms. Thus she is better off consulting FR if, conditional on this event, her expected payoff from hiring is greater than her expected payoff from not hiring.
The latter payoff is zero. We therefore need to evaluate the principal's payoff from offering a h-task to an agent who is marked on account of having cheated in a not-h task, and to find conditions under which this payoff is positive. These then will precisely be the conditions under which the principal will prefer to consult the FR register.
Since the economy is in steady-state and agents are following their optimal strategies, the agent who is marked as a result of a non-h infraction must be a h-type agent. In other words, the task h which has been drawn is the agent's preferred task. Recall from proposition 3.2 that such an agent will cooperate when hired if he has τ ≤ τ * periods of punishment remaining, where τ * is defined in equation (5).
At any date, there are T equal cohorts of agents of each type that are in punishment, with one such cohort having entered punishment in each of the previous T periods. τ * of these cohorts have τ * or less periods remaining, thus the fraction of such agents who will cooperate when hired is τ * T . Thus for an arbitrary agent of this type, this is the probability that the agent will cooperate, while with the remaining probability 1 − τ * T he will defect. If the agent cooperates the principal gets (z − w) while if he defects she gets −w. Thus the principal's expected payoff is z
Proposition 6.1 For a given wage w ∈ (ŵ,ŵ 1 ) the principal prefers to consult the FR mechanism if condition 15 is satisfied. For w ≤ŵ there is no cooperation and the condition is never satisfied, while for w ≥ŵ 1 there is full cooperation and the principal is indifferent between consulting one or the other mechanism.
Thus it is sufficient to limit attention to the range w ∈ (ŵ,ŵ 1 ). Note from equation (5) that τ * is independent of z, so if z is sufficiently large the principal will prefer to consult the FR register rather than the IR. The shape of τ * , which is a function of w, is relevant for what follows:
Proposition 6.2 τ * (w) attains a value of zero at w =ŵ, is increasing and concave in w, and remains smaller than T for all finite w.
τ * (w) T is concave and remains less than unity, while w z is a straight line starting at the origin and attains the value of unity at w = z. The two curves are graphed in figure 2 for two sets of parameter values.
There are three general scenarios. One is that the line w z passes entirely above the curve, as in figure 2a. The condition 15 is then not satisfied at any wage, and hence the FR registers would not be consulted at all by principals.
Alternatively, the line w z intersects the curve at two points to the left ofŵ 1 , and condition (15) is satisfied for wages between these points. Finally, the line w z may intersect the curve once at w = v * , and remain below it for all wages w ≤ŵ 1 . Then principals prefer to consult the FR register if the wage is higher than v * (figure 2b).
In general there is no obvious correspondence between the conditions under which principals prefer to use the FR mechanism, and the conditions under which the FR mechanism is more efficient as discussed in the previous section. Thus it is quite possible that principals may switch to FR even though it is less efficient to do so, or conversely that they may not use the FR mechanism even though a switch to FR would have been more efficient.
A large variety of patterns can be generated using numerical simulations.
One possibility which follows easily from considerations already discussed is stated below. Theorem 6.3 : If z is sufficiently large, then there is w * ∈ (w,ŵ 1 ) with the following property:
for w ∈ (w * ,ŵ 1 ), the FR mechanism is less efficient than the IR, but principals prefer to consult the FR mechanism.
In other words, when the economy is highly productive and workers are relatively prosperous, individual incentives may lead to the wrong institutional choice being endogenously made. Figures 1a and 2a , drawn for the same parameter values, illustrate a case where IR dominates FR everywhere, and the FR mechanism will not be used at any wage. In contrast, the economy in figures 1b and 2b is one in which FR dominates in a small interval (about 0.7 to 1.1), but transition will take place at a large range of wages (all wages higher than about 0.8).
In figure 3, transition possibilities from IR to FR are offset against the efficiency comparison in T − w space. For given values of the other parameters, figure 3a shows the combinations of T and w for which condition (15) is satisfied-i.e., conditions under which a transition from IR to FR may be expected. Figure 3b shows combinations for which FR generates (weakly) more surplus than does IR. 10 It is clear that transition from IR to FR may happen in a large area of the parameter space where IR is in fact the more efficient mechanism.
Conclusion
This paper had two complementary objectives. One was to produce a model of reputation mechanisms which structure incentives for cooperation, and compare two different such mechanisms which have in fact been observed to operate at different times and places. The particular question of interest which we have attempted to address is whether the availability of one mechanism may disrupt equilibrium under the other, and generate a movement away from the incumbent to the competing mechanism.
The other aim-within the context of that analysis-was to demonstrate 10 The hatched area in figure 3b corresponds to values where both mechanisms generate zero or S * .
that such a movement may in fact occur because it is profitable for the individual; however, the equilibrium that would result if all individuals adopted the change may nevertheless be inferior. Given a contract, his discounted expected payoff is:
if he cooperates, and
if he defects, where a = a 0 , α depending on the task. Substituting from (17) and simplifying, we find that he will cooperate iff
A comparison with (2) in the text shows immediately that the left-hand side of (19 is smaller thanâ(w) ≤ α, thus the agent will defect in the dispreferred task. However, the LHS is continuous in τ and equalsâ(w) > a 0 when τ = 0.
Thus for a = a 0 and τ small enough, the inequality (19) is satisfied, and the agent will cooperate in the preferred task. The threshold level τ * is the value for which (19) holds with equality for a = a 0 . Thus his optimal strategy, which is paraphrased in the proposition, is
Proof of proposition 3.3: From proposition (3.1) we know that the only agents who will defect are those with α >α and are assigned to their dispreferred tasks. So the proportion of potential defectors across the two tasks isθ(w) = α 1 −α α 1 − α 0 . By (6), T T + 2θ (w) of these are marked at any given time, and 2 T + 2θ (w) are unmarked.
Hence the total number of unmarked agents is 1 −θ(w) + 2 T + 2θ (w). Of these, half of the unmarked defectors, or 1 T + 2θ (w) will be assigned to their dispreferred tasks and defect when offered a contract. Hence, 1 −θ(w) + 1 T + 2θ (w) will cooperate.
The principal pays w if she offers a contract, and receives z if the agent cooperates. Using these to calculate expected payoff, and simplifying we find that the principal's expected payoff if she offers a contract is non-negative if w ≤ŵ z .
Proof of proposition 3.4: A marked agent will cooperate when offered a contract if and only if it is in his preferred transaction, and he is in a period τ ≤ τ * of his punishment. Since the economy is in steady state, agents enter punishment at a constant rate in each period, and the number of agents in each stage τ = 1, ..., T of punishment is 1/T . Thus the probability that the agent will cooperate is 1 2 τ * T , and the principal's expected net gain from offering a contract is 1 2 τ * T z − w. For the principal to deny contracts to marked agents, this net gain must be non-positive, which yields the condition in assumption (3).
Proof of proposition 4.1: Consider an agent i who has been contracted to perform transaction j, and does not have a mark on his j-record. In any future period, he will be assigned to a principal who has drawn task j with probability 1 2 . If his strategy is to cooperate in transaction j, then his expected discounted payoff from j-assignments is
where the first term between the equality signs is the current period payoff, and the second term is the expected discounted payoff in future periods.
If instead he pursues a strategy of defecting when assigned to transaction j, his payoff is Proof of proposition 6.2: Rewrite (5) as
Note that the denominator of the second term on the RHS is in factâ(w) which reduces to a 0 when w =ŵ, implying that τ * = 0. Also note that δ τ * is greater than δ T for all finite w, implying that τ * < T . As w increases, δ τ * approaches δ T from above, implying that τ * approaches T from below since
δ ∈]0, 1[. The concavity of τ * (w) can be demonstrated by differentiating twice and establishing that the second derivative is negative.
Proof of proposition 6.3: Choose z sufficiently large such thatŵ 1 /z < τ * (ŵ 1 )/T . This is feasible since the function τ * (w) is independent of z.
Then the line w/z lies below the curve τ * /T in the neighbourhood ofŵ 1 , hence there is an interval I 1 of wages withŵ 1 as its right-hand limit such that principals will choose to use FR if the wage is in this interval.
We know from proposition 5.3 that there is an interval I 2 aroundŵ 1 in which IR generates greater surplus than does FR. The intersection between I 1 and I 2 is then a set of wages in which the proposition holds. Values: , z = 3 a 0 = 0.5, α 0 = 0.5, α 1 = 1.5, δ = 0.9.
